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Abstract 
In 2007, Liu proposed an improvement of Shieh et al. multi-signature scheme in mobile code system. There exist 
forgery attacks of multiplicative algebra method in his scheme. It is therefore insecure for his improvement. In this 
paper, we pointed out who do a forge attack successfully. 
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1. Introduction 
People tend to communicate with each other on the internet through common but insecure channels. 
Because of this, proving the source and confirming the integrity of transmitted messages becomes an 
important issue. Making digital signatures is more significant than ever. Most internet applications require 
the help of digital signatures for authentication purposes, such as authenticating electronic tax reports, 
stock transactions, and electronic commerce deals. This is the major reason why digital signatures have 
become so valuable in the modern digital data processing world. Several important works dealing with 
digital signatures have been proposed in [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]. In Shieh et al. scheme [7], the required 
memory for local devices is greatly abridged. They do not use message redundancy or one-way hash 
functions. However, Hwang pointed out the underlying signature from the forgery attack [8]. Wu [9] 
demonstrated some insider forgery attacks. Recently, Chang and Chang [10] presented a new digital 
signature without using one-way hash functions or message redundancy and claimed that their scheme 
modified the properties of Shieh et al. scheme. Afterward, Zhang [11] showed that Chang et al.’s version 
was still vulnerable to forgery attacks. Liu [12] improved the signature which is based on Shieh’s scheme 
using neither one-way hash functions nor message redundancy. In this paper, we point out a leak in Liu’s 
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signature scheme that shows it is not secure. Section 2 briefly reviews Liu’s improvement signature 
scheme. Section 3 is our attack method. A conclusion will be drawn in Section 4. 
2.  Review of Liu’S Signature Scheme 
2.1 Liu’s Scheme 
There are two public system parameters, p and g, where p is a large prime and g is a primitive element 
in GF(p). Each user selects his private key xi and computes his public key 
 
  xiy g mod p .i{   (1) 
with gcd(xi,p - 1) = 1. Each user agrees upon the same system parameters p and g. Liu’s underlying 
digital signature scheme is composed of two phases: the signature generation phase and the verification 
phase. Here, we use the same notation as in [12]. 
2.2 Signature Generation Phase: 
Step 1. Ui computes 
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Step 2. Ui randomly selects an integer number ki in [1, pͲ1] and computes 
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Step 4. Ui sends the signature (si; ri; ti) of mi to the verifier V . 
2.3 Verification Phase: 
Step 1. V computes 
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Step 2. V checks whether 
   is mod p .i
m
i
y{    (6) 
If it holds, V can be convinced that (si; ri; ti) is indeed the signature generated by Ui in the recovered 
message m iƍ. 
3. Our Attack 
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In this section, we assume that si is relatively prime to (p-1). Then the equation for the signature 
generation can be modified as the new equation 
     i i i i ix t s k r mod p-1- - .{     (7) 
A universal forgery attack by chosen message attack is given below. Suppose that an attack has a 
signature (si; ri; ti) on some chosen message mi, where mi is relatively prime to (p-1). Now the attacker 
Eve wants to forge a signature (s iĄ, riĄ,t iĄ) on some message m iĄ. 
Step 1. Eve computes 
  iim / m mod p 1 .G {   c    (8) 
Here assume that is relative prime to (p-1). Cause (p-1) contains a large prime factor, it is possible 
that is relative prime to (p-1). 
Step 2. Eve computes 
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The following shows why this attack can work successfully. 
Proof:
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4. Conclusion 
We proposed an forgery attack to Liu’s signature scheme which it existed an algebra construction 
leakage of multiplicative. In our method, we successfully forged a valid signature to cheat Liu’s scheme. 
It is therefore that the Liu’s scheme cannot against forgery attack. 
Acknowledgements 
The authors would like to thank anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments. This research is 
partially supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No. 61103247, and 
the Fuqing Branch of Fujian Normal University of China under the contract numbers KY2010-030 and 
KY2008-022. 
References 
658   Shaoka Zhao and Chenglian Liu /  Energy Procedia  17 ( 2012 )  655 – 658 
 
[1] T. ElGamal, ‘A Public Key Cryptosystem and a Signature Scheme Based On Discrete Logarithm,’ IEEE Transaction 
on Information Theory, Vol. IT-31, pp.469-472, July 1985. 
[2] L. Harn, ‘New Digital Signature Scheme Based on Discrete Logarithm,’ Electronics Letters, Vol. 30, No. 5, pp. 
296-298, Mar. 1994. 
[3] S.-J. Hwang, C.-C. Chang, and W.-P. Yang, ‘An Encryption Signature Scheme with Low Message Expansion,’ J. 
Chinese Inst. Eng., Vol. 18, No.4, pp. 591-595, Sept. 1995. 
[4] K. Nyberg and R.-A. Rueppel, ’Message Recovery for Signature Schemes Based on the Discrete Logarithm Problem,’ 
In Proc. Eurocrypt’94, Perugia, Italy, May 1994, pp. 182-193. 
[5] J. M. Piveteau, ‘New Signature Scheme with Message Recovery,’ Electronics Letters, Vol. 29, No. 25, pp. 2185-2185, 
Dec. 1993. 
[6] Z. Shao, ‘Signature Scheme Based on Discrete Logarithm Without Using One-way Hash Function,’ Electronics Letters, 
Vol. 34, No. 11, pp. 1079-1080, May 1998. 
[7] S.-P. Shieh, C.-T. Lin, W.-B. Yang and H.-M. Sun, ‘Digital Multisignature Scheme for Authenticating Delegates in 
Mobile Code Systems,’ IEEE Transaction on Vehicular Technology, Vol. 49, pp.1464-1473, July 2000. 
[8] S-J. Hwang and E.-T. Li, ‘Cryptanalysis of Shieh-Lin-Yang- Sun Signature Scheme,’ IEEE Communications Letters, 
Vol. 7, No. 4, April 2003. 
[9] T.-C. Wu and C.-L. Hsu, ‘Cryptanalysis of Digital Multisignature Scheme for Authenticating Delegates in Mobile 
Code Systems,’ IEEE Transaction on Vehicular Technology, Vol. 52, No. 2, pp.462-465, March 2003. 
[10] C.-C. Chang and Y.-F. Chang, ‘Signing a Digital Signature Without Using One-Way Hash Functions and Message 
Redundancy Schemes,’ IEEE Communication Letter, Vol. 8, No.8, pp.485-487, August 2004. 
[11] F. Zhang, ‘Cryptanalysis of Chang et al. Signature Scheme with Message Recovery,’ IEEE Communication Letter, Vol. 
9, No. 4, pp. 358-359, April 2005. 
[12] C. Liu, ‘An Improvement of Shieh et al.’s Multi-Signature Scheme in Mobile Code Systems,’ The 17th Cryptology and 
Information Security Conference (CISC 2007), Chiayi, Taiwan, August 2007. 
